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The Health and Social Service area of the state of 
Illinois’ budget has comprised roughly 40 percent 
of state expenditures in recent years.1 When leaders 
decide to cut the state budget, this area is inevitably 
on the chopping block.  
This area includes Medicaid, child care subsidies, 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), 
services for persons with developmental disabilities, 
and mental health services, to name a few. Spending 
took an enormous bump down in FY 2012 (just over 15 
percent) and a hefty 5.6 percent cut for good measure 
in FY 2013 before an uptick in 2014 (see Figure 1). 
When viewed in a longer historical context, these cuts 
fit into a long-term downward trend. Indeed, the state 
has cut human services in the past decade by nearly 
one-quarter in inflation-adjusted, per capita terms.2 
1Merriman, David, Hudspeth, Nancy and Crosby, Andrew. 
(2012). The Illinois state budget: How bad is the picture, and what can 
you do about it? University of Illinois Institute of Government and 
Public Affairs. Available at http://igpa.uillinois.edu/system/files/
The_Illinois_State_Budget_What_Can_You_Do.pdf
2Change from FY 2002 to FY 2013, see page 3 of Kaslow, Yerik 
and Terpstra, Amy. (March 22, 2012). Ramifications of state budget 
In the context of an already-squeezed Human Services 
budget, policymakers may find strategies of across-
the-board or program cuts decreasingly palatable. 
Nearly all the programs left in the human services 
system today have survived multiple rounds of 
tough programmatic cuts. Examples of such cuts are 
eliminating specific services, withdrawing services 
from the slightly better-off, and imposing or increasing 
co-payments. As programs have been whittled down, 
individuals who remain eligible tend to have a more 
acute need for them. Policymakers eventually reach 
a point where wringing further savings from human 
services programs through cuts threatens to distort 
the original programs beyond recognition. Thus, an 
appealing alternative to program cuts is to get tougher 
on waste, fraud, and abuse. 
The logic of auditing our way to savings
The public has long taken a dim view of “welfare” 
programs, including suspicions of criminal activity 
on the part of recipients, and Illinois is no exception. 
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In fact, the original “Welfare Queen,” a convicted 
criminal who captured the imagination of the national 
media and ultimately helped Ronald Reagan to 
victory, committed her crimes in Chicago. 
So it is not surprising that the public and many 
policymakers consider “Waste, Fraud, and Abuse” a 
rampant problem. Waste can be present in program 
administration, although, given Illinois’s low 
government staffing resources, one could well argue 
that inefficiency in the system is the result of too little 
investment in Human Services administration rather 
than too much. Documented cases of fraud involve 
individuals in programs, higher-ranking individuals 
in state government, and program vendors.3 Programs 
are “abused” when people become overly-dependent 
on them, or participate in them in the absence of real 
3For an example regarding state employees see Hinz, Greg. 
(November 7, 2013). No degree, no address, nine names—
and one great state job. Crain’s Chicago Business. Available 
at http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20131107/
BLOGS02/131109867/no-degree-no-address-nine-names-and-one-
great-state-job. (Footnote continued in next column.)
For an example regarding program vendors see Chicago Tribune 
search, keyword “Medicaid fraud.” Available at http://articles.
chicagotribune.com/keyword/medicare-fraud.
need. This short paper focuses on the question of 
fraudulent receipt of benefits by program recipients, a 
focus of recent high-profile efforts to reduce Medicaid 
spending in the state.4
As a money-saving strategy, attacking “waste, fraud, 
and abuse” on the part of recipients relies on three 
implicit assumptions:
• A significant number of clearly undeserving 
individuals are enrolled in a program.
• These undeserving enrollees account for non-
trivial state expenditures. 
• Undeserving enrollees can be identified and 
investigated without inordinate cost. 
If any one of these assumptions does not hold, then 
this strategy for cutting spending may be ineffective. 
Undeserving Enrollees. Defining an undeserving 
enrollee can be more difficult than appears at first 
blush. To define the population of eligibles, Human 
Service programs typically rely on income and 
asset limits, family structure, disability status, and 
age. Some programs also rely on further inputs to 
eligibility determination such as medical bills. Because 
the initial eligibility process is fairly rigorous, people 
with characteristics far from the eligibility standards 
are unlikely to become enrolled in a program except 
by deception. Because program cut-offs are sharply 
defined and because a good number of household 
units appear throughout the lower part of the income 
distribution, many households live in circumstances 
that place them near to, but not exactly at, the 
eligibility cutoff. Households with characteristics very 
close to eligibility limits are “marginally eligible” or 
“marginally ineligible” for the program. Because 
the inputs to the eligibility calculation are always 
changing, status transitions from being just ineligible 
to just eligible and back again are frequent. 
What are the implications of the realities of program 
eligibility for the first assumption, namely, that a 
substantial number of enrollees are nondeserving? 
First, with the exception of fraudulent deception, 
egregious cases of ineligibility can be weeded out with 
competent intake processes. Second, the frequency 
with which a person’s eligibility is re-evaluated 
4A note on terms: I use “eligibles” to describe the group that 
would be able to enroll in a program due to their circumstances. 
Individuals in this group may or may not be actually enrolled, 
however. I use “enrollee,” “participant,” and “recipient” 
interchangeably. The state often refers to recipients as 
















Figure 1: Annual nominal and real expenditures in 
Human Services, FY 2010 to FY 2014, with year to 













* Deflated as of July of each year, with the exception of FY 
14, which relies upon the CPIU for December 2013. 
See: ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt.
Source: Illinois Department of Human Services Briefing 
Presentations, 2013, 2014. 
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(called “redetermination”) may be longer than a day, 
a week, a month, or even a quarter. Under a high-
frequency redetermination strategy, the state would 
identify (mostly) marginal ineligibles for elimination 
from the program, but it would face the costs of re-
administering program re-entry for many of them 
before too long. In addition, even if marginally 
ineligible recipients are technically ineligible most 
of the time, they belong to the range of low-resource 
households that the program overall seeks to help. 
Being a few dollars outside an eligibility threshold 
does not mean the unit is “undeserving.” Rather it is a 
byproduct of the fact that in order to limit a program 
to a certain size, a definitive cutoff is necessary. 
The Cost of Undeserving Enrollees. The bulk of marginal 
enrollees who are found to be ineligible and dropped 
from the program may not generate much savings 
to the state. Many programs provide benefits that 
are pro-rated in some way, such as the child care 
program, which imposes co-payments for recipients 
that rise with their income. When marginal ineligibles 
are removed from programs with sliding benefits, 
the state’s costs are not reduced by much, because 
the awarded benefits to these people are small. In 
contrast, it may seem reasonable to suppose that in the 
case of an “all or nothing” benefit, such as Medicaid, 
even kicking out marginally ineligible recipients from 
the program could save a lot of money. As discussed 
below, however, recent experience indicates that even 
this supposition is doubtful. 
What of fraudulent enrollees? How numerous and 
how costly are they? In light of the fact that most 
program benefits tend to be small, one might question 
the sanity of individuals who would put their liberty 
at risk for such a modest ‘reward.’ States’ experiences 
with overpayments in the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP) support this intuition. 
Available statistics suggest that net overpayments 
attributable to recipient “fault” amounted to less than 
1 percent of all payments made by the program in 
2011.5
The Cost-Effectiveness of Redetermination. The third 
assumption is that identification and removal of 
undeserving enrollees in a program is a cost-effective 
proposition. As noted, if a blanket investigation of 
5States report that 40 percent of overpayments are enrollees’ 
fault and a net overpayment rate of 2.19 percent of all benefits 
paid out. Multiplying these two figures together indicates a net 
overpayment rate not attributable to state error of 0.88 percent. 
See Rosenbaum, Dottie. (March 11, 2013). SNAP is effective and 
efficient. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. Available at 
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=3239.
all enrollees is conducted, most of those identified 
as problem cases are likely to be in the marginally 
ineligible group, a group that does not contain many 
“undeserving” and costly recipients. Some evidence 
from real-world policy supports this hypothesis. For 
instance, the auditor of the state of California found 
that identifying and prosecuting fraudulent activities 
of people already in their main welfare assistance 
program was quite expensive, whereas applying 
additional scrutiny to new applicants who appeared 
to have high potential for fraud was cost-effective.6 
These findings support a strategy of investing most 
recipient-targeted audit resources at the initial 
eligibility determination. 
Looking for waste, fraud, and abuse in the state’s 
Medicaid program
A substantial driver of human services funding is the 
Medicaid program. In 2013, the state began making 
specific Medicaid cuts. By ending prescription drug 
programs and dental care for adults and seniors, the 
state reduced program costs by $250 million. These 
were very painful cuts to vital services, including the 
elimination of adult dental care coverage. Half again 
as much ($120 million) was proposed by the state to 
be saved through eliminating enrollees who would be 
found to be ineligible for Medicaid.7
In September 2013, the state engaged a for-profit firm, 
Maximus, at a cost of $35 million per year, to scrutinize 
the eligibility rolls. Since state workers make the final 
determination of eligibility, the firm recommended to 
them which clients be continued, changed in status, 
or canceled from Medicaid. IDHS estimates that an 
additional $21 million was spent on staff support for 
this redetermination project.8
By January 13, 2014, Maximus had recommended 
that nearly 250,000 cases be canceled, that 60,500 be 
6See California State Auditor’s Report 2009, 101 Summary 
(November 2009). Available at http://www.bsa.ca.gov/reports/
summary/2009-101
7Merriman, David, Hudspeth, Nancy and Crosby, Andrew. (June 
2012). The Illinois state budget: How bad is the picture, and what can 
you do about it? University of Illinois Institute of Government and 
Public Affairs. Available at http://igpa.uillinois.edu/system/files/
The_Illinois_State_Budget_What_Can_You_Do.pdf.
8The Maximus contract will terminate in April due to a 
ruling that the state inappropriately contracted this work 
out, violating its labor contract with its workers. For more, 
see Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services. 
(September 2013). Illinois Medicaid redetermination project: Cost 




changed in status, and that 230,000 be continued as 
before. The fact that the contractor recommended 
nearly half of reviewed cases for cancellation seems 
to suggest ample “waste, fraud, and abuse” upon 
which to capitalize. Of the cases processed through 
that date, state workers approved 70 percent of the 
recommended cancellations (alternatively, one-third 
of all cases reviewed).9 However, of those actually 
cancelled, as many as 20 percent were shortly 
thereafter re-enrolled in the program. A high re-
enrollment rate is not surprising, considering that 
shorter-run fluctuations in circumstances often drive 
eligibility. More re-enrollment will likely be seen from 
this group going forward. 
Nevertheless, around 140,000 cases were cancelled 
without near-term re-enrollment, representing 
around 238,000 persons. That sounds like a big 
number of individuals, so what were the cost savings? 
IDHS found that many of the people cancelled from 
Medicaid had not claimed services for a long while (6 
months or more). While we don’t have a breakdown of 
the reasons why services were not claimed, it is likely 
that many of the people in this group simply stopped 
using the program because they no longer had urgent 
medical needs, no longer faced large medical bills, 
found other sources of health care resources, or knew 
themselves to be ineligible (e.g., due to a move). The 
per-month savings per cancelled client was estimated 
at just $58. Extrapolating from that experience, the 
total cost savings from the Maximus contract will be 
at most $105 million. Given payments to Maximus 
and additional administrative costs, the state will net 
at most $50 million dollars. Note also that “large” cost 
reductions are generated only once, as the large bulk 
of existing cases is reviewed for the first time. Savings 
going forward from increased redetermination effort 
will be a trickle, not a flood.10 While $50 million is a 
lot of money, it is far short of the hoped-for $120M 
total savings in Medicaid. The limited success from 
this approach suggests that policymakers consider 
applying other “smart” approaches to cost savings. 
9Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services. 
(February 3, 2014). IMRP to date summary report. Available 
at http://www2.illinois.gov/hfs/SiteCollectionDocuments/
IMRPReport.pdf
10With a switch to managed care, IDHS notes that the state will 
pay a capitated fee. Thus, removing ineligible enrollees will 
become a more pressing matter. This observation highlights the 
fact that Medicaid fee-for-service is somewhat self-enforcing with 
regard to eligibility. That is, the state does not receive bills for 
enrollees who don’t need Medicaid services. This aspect should 
properly be incorporated when discussing the true savings from 
a managed care system.
Policies for smart administration of programs
In most programs, even the maximum benefit 
attainable by the individual is fairly small. And, as 
spelled out in this paper, the type of recipient likely to 
be targeted for an audit or discovered to be ineligible 
at redetermination typically collects smaller benefits 
still. Because of these realities, the really big money 
in defrauding most human services programs is 
mostly available to those in a position to “aggregate” 
program benefits, not individual recipients. This 
insight is the reason why provider fraud in Medicaid 
(and Medicare) is such an important concern at the 
federal level and also the reason that a great deal of 
enforcement effort in the SNAP program is directed 
at stores.11 While these cases can be complex and 
expensive to investigate and prosecute, the cost 
savings—including the value of deterring others who 
might engage in this behavior—are potentially large. 
Evidence from some past redetermination efforts, 
as well as Illinois’ efforts in Medicaid, suggest that 
we may be able to improve the cost savings per 
administrative dollar spent by taking a more targeted 
approach to eligibility evaluation. The California 
experience, although just one example, suggests that 
focusing resources on initial eligibility determination 
and screening may be a good investment. Keeping 
people with intent to commit fraud out of the system 
in the first place turns out to be much cheaper than 
discovering such individuals and removing them 
from the system once they have laid claim to a benefit. 
That suggests focusing enforcement efforts on fair but 
accurate and thorough scrutiny of new applicants, 
rather than doing a blanket sweep of all recipients, 
regardless of their use of the system.
Improvements to administrative systems could cut 
costs and improve programs at once. Specifically, by 
creating a more complete linkage of state records of 
all kinds together in accessible databases, program 
workers can verify income, family status, and other 
eligibility inputs accurately and expediently. This 
type of reform helps the system run more efficiently 
11On Medicaid fraud: King, Kathleen and Daly, Kay L. (March 
9, 2011). Medicare and Medicaid fraud, waste and abuse: Effective 
implementation of recent laws and agency actions could help reduce 
improper payments. United States Government Office Testimony 
before the subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, 
Government Information, Federal Services, and International 
Security, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, U.S. Senate. Available at http://www.gao.gov/
assets/130/125646.pdf. 
On SNAP fraud: Rosenbaum, Dottie. (March 11, 2013). SNAP 
is effective and efficient. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. 
Available at http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=3239.
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while at the same time exposing and deterring fraud. 
In addition, individuals and families can be better 
helped by timely and accurate service and referral to 
appropriate programs and other resources that may 
be available for them. Unfortunately, the state has not 
made much progress in this area. Human Services 
workers continue to rely on systems that are program-
specific and usually at least 25 years old.12
Finally, the state has a long history of undisciplined 
contracting with vendors in many human service 
areas. The system is short on accountability and 
transparency and has been rife with special pleading, 
non-merit-based awards, and even outright fraud. 
A systemic reform of the state’s human services 
contracting system that emphasizes capacity, merit, 
and performance is long overdue.13  
Conclusion
It is an undisputed fact that undeserving recipients 
have sometimes defrauded welfare programs. The 
purpose of this  paper has not been to argue that 
limiting waste, fraud, and abuse in human services 
programs is not important, or that the state should 
take a “know-nothing” attitude toward eligibility. 
Experience, however, suggests several approaches 
that might be more productive.
Illinois should be vigilant in guarding against large-
scale crimes, which originate with entities that are 
able to aggregate benefits. Theory and evidence also 
suggest that scouring an entire program for fraud may 
not be the most cost-effective approach. Instead, it may 
be better to scrutinize new applicants and selectively 
target cases for more frequent redetermination that 
have characteristics associated with fraudulent 
outcomes. Improving administrative systems overall, 
especially by creating linked records, would have the 
benefit of not only discouraging waste and fraud but 
helping the system run more efficiently for deserving 
recipients as well. Finally, reforms to state contracting 
standards and procedures have the potential to 
improve overall effectiveness of human services 
programs while also discouraging waste, fraud, and 
abuse. •
12Illinois Human Services Commission. (June 2010). Human 
services in Illinois: A point-in-time review of the current system. 
Available at https://www2.illinois.gov/hsc/Documents/HSC%20
First%20Report%206-30-10.pdf.
13See the discussion of current problems and a blueprint for 
reform provided in: Donor’s Forum. (January 2010). Fair 
and accountable: Partnership principles for a sustainable human 
services system. Available at http://www.donorsforum.org/s_
donorsforum/bin.asp?CID=19380&DID=33993&DOC=FILE.PDF
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